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Is Ecuador That Wrong?: Analyzing the Ecuadorian 
Proposals Concerning the Special Rapporteurship on 
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights
by Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga*
IntroductIon
In June 2011, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), following the instructions given during the 41st regular session of the General Assembly of 
the OAS, decided to create a “Special Working Group to Reflect 
on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights with a View to Strengthening the 
Inter-American Human Rights System” 
(Working Group). The Permanent Council 
directed the Working Group to submit its 
final recommendations at the Council’s 
regular meeting in December 2011.1
In the course of the 23 meetings the 
Working Group held during six months 
of passionate debate, it focused its atten-
tion on eight topics: 1) the appoint-
ment of the next Executive Secretary 
of the Inter-American Commission; 2) 
challenges and medium and long-term 
objectives of the Commission; 3) pre-
cautionary measures; 4) procedural mat-
ters in processing cases and individual 
petitions; 5) friendly settlements; 6) criteria for constructing 
Chapter IV of the Commission’s Annual Report; 7) promotion 
of human rights; and 8) financially strengthening the Inter-
American Human Rights System.2
The Working Group opened its meetings to delegations from 
all OAS Member States and received presentations that were 
subsequently published in a combined document.3 The States 
were also allowed to submit proposals.4 Furthermore, the Group 
received recommendations from the Secretary General of the 
OAS and from civil society organizations.5 The Commission had 
the opportunity to attend all meetings.
The creation of the Working Group was 
viewed with suspicion by the Commission 
and by many civil society organizations 
because it was considered a reaction of 
the States to several “uncomfortable” 
decisions adopted by the Commission. 
The Working Group’s true intention was, 
according to some, to weaken the system 
of protection and to silence or control the 
Commission, affecting its independence 
and impartiality.6 The Ecuadorian pro-
posals were viewed as an example of such 
intention, the most controversial being 
the ones related to the Commission’s 
rapporteurships.7
Ecuador’s proposals on this issue consisted of four sugges-
tions: 1) The OAS should finance the Commission from its 
own resources, and until this goal is achieved, the Commission 
should establish a policy that voluntary contributions it receives 
cannot be conditioned or earmarked; 2) the Commission should 
correct the imbalance of economic and human resources in its 
rapporteurships; 3) a Code of Conduct should be established to 
govern the management of the rapporteurships; and 4) the report 
presented annually by the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of 
Expression (SRFE) should be presented the same way as that of 
the other rapporteurships.8
Described as a “blow,” “swipe,” and “stab” against the SRFE,9 
the Ecuadorian proposals were approved by the Working Group 
— although with less confrontational wording than originally 
presented10 — and subsequently by the Permanent Council.11 
The OAS General Assembly welcomed the Working Group’s 
report on June 5, 2012, and instructed the Permanent Council, 
on the basis of said report, to draw up proposals for its appli-
cation, which would be presented for the General Assembly’s 
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consideration within six months or no later than the first quarter 
of 2013.12
The current Ecuadorian government has been accused of 
attacking freedom of expression and having a hostile relation-
ship with the press, the SRFE, and the Commission, but apart 
from the government’s potential political motivations, does 
Ecuador have a point? Is there an imbalance in the attention the 
Commission devotes to the right to freedom of expression, or is 
this only a delusional idea of an upset government? If such dis-
tinction truly exists, is Ecuador correct when it denounces a lack 
of independence or impartiality of the Commission?13 In order 
to answer these questions, a brief analysis of the Commission’s 
rapporteurships is needed.
the commISSIon’S raPPorteurShIPS
The Commission’s rapporteurships are classified by country, 
theme, and type. Country rapporteurs monitor the human rights 
situation of a specific country. According to the Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure, it may designate its commissioners as coun-
try rapporteurs, “in which case the Commission will ensure that 
each Member State of the OAS has a rapporteur.”14 The Rules of 
Procedures strive for a balance in the attention the Commission 
gives to all the countries in the region. All 35 OAS Member 
States have a country rapporteur.
The Commission may also create rapporteurships to cover 
areas “deemed of special interest.”15 These are called thematic 
rapporteurships. So far the Commission has created eight such 
rapporteurships: indigenous people, women, migrant work-
ers, freedom of expression, children, human rights defenders, 
persons deprived of liberty, and Afro-descendants.
Finally, there are two types of rapporteurships: regular and 
special. Regular rapporteurships are the ones assigned to a 
Commissioner, that is to say, to persons elected by the General 
Assembly of the OAS as members of the Commission for a 
renewable term of four years. Conversely, special rapporteurships 
are assigned to other persons designated by the Commission. 
Special rapporteurs are not commissioners since they were not 
elected by the General Assembly. So far the Commission has only 
created one special rapporteurship: the SRFE.
the SPecIal raPPorteurShIP on freedom of 
exPreSSIon
The Commission created the SRFE during its 97th period of 
sessions, held in October 1997, with the purpose of “strengthen-
ing the capacity of the [Commission] to promote and protect full 
observance of this important right in the Americas, and thus help 
to ensure its effective exercise.”16
Whether the Commission had the power to create the SRFE is 
an issue that deserves further research. The American Convention 
on Human Rights17 and the Statute of the Commission,18 both 
instruments adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS, do 
not explicitly mention this power. The only instrument that 
gives explicit legal support to this type of rapporteurship is the 
Rules of Procedure of the Commission, which the Commission 
itself adopted, not the OAS Member States. The Commission’s 
initiative to create the SRFE, however, was supported by 
Member States.19 The question then is not whether the States 
supported the creation of the SRFE but whether this support 
was required for the SRFE’s functioning or as an approval of 
the Commission’s decision. It seems that the Commission does 
not consider the support of the States necessary in either of 
these senses. According to its Rules of Procedure, the creation 
of special rapporteurships is a decision of the Commission and 
the Commission alone. States are not even informed of this deci-
sion. They will find out that a new special rapporteurship will be 
created when the Commission makes a call to fill the vacancy.20
Another issue that deserves further research is the binding 
power of the recommendations and conclusions of special rap-
porteurs. Since they are not commissioners, their remarks should 
not have the same binding power as those of the commissioners 
(whatever this might be). Usually, the conclusions of the SRFE 
are later approved or otherwise supported by the Commission, 
but this is not always the case. The SRFE issues documents, 
such as press releases, where it presents its observations as an 
office of the Commission but without mentioning whether the 
Commission agrees.
As to the creation of the SRFE, two questions arise: 1) why 
did the Commission decide to create this particular rapporteur-
ship, and 2) why did it decide that the rapporteurship should be 
special?
the decISIon to create the Srfe
The only explanation given by the Commission for its 
decision to create the SRFE was that the right to freedom of 
expression is an important right in the Americas that needed 
to be promoted, protected, and whose effective exercise needed 
to be ensured.21 But the same explanation could be given for 
any other right. The rights to freedom of association, freedom 
of religion, social rights, and basically all other human rights 
are also important rights in the Americas that need promotion 
and protection.
the “SPecIal” character of the Srfe
At the time the SFRE was created there were only three 
regular thematic rapporteurships: indigenous peoples, women, 
and migrant workers. In other words, only three of the seven 
commissioners were assigned a thematic rapporteurship; the 
other four commissioners acted only as country rapporteurs. 
Why the Commission decided to hire an outside expert as a 
special rapporteur, when four of its members could have easily 
assumed the new rapporteurship of freedom of expression as a 
regular rapporteur, is a question the Commission has not answered.
Furthermore, the Commission seems to have no uniform 
criteria for the creation of rapporteurships and their mandates.
dIfferent ProceSS of creatIon
Although the SRFE was created from the beginning as a 
special rapporteurship, other rapporteurships had to transit 
a more difficult road. That is the case of the Rapporteurship 
on Human Rights Defenders, which started in 2001 as a 
“unit” under the framework of the Commission’s Executive 
Secretariat. Only after ten years of gathering information 
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and receiving several requests from civil 
society organizations was it “promoted” 
to a regular rapporteurship, but not to 
a special rapporteurship, despite the 
fact that human rights defenders face a 
critical situation in the Americas.22 All 
the rapporteurships that followed (chil-
dren, persons deprived of liberty, and 
Afro-descendants) are also regular 
rapporteurships.
dIfferent tyPeS of mandateS
The SRFE is the only rapporteurship 
devoted to a specific right, with all 
others rapporteurships devoted to groups 
in a situation of vulnerability. Although journalists could be 
considered a group at risk in certain countries in the region, 
the SRFE is not a rapporteurship on journalists. It studies all the 
aspects of the right to freedom of expression, including but not 
limited to journalists’ rights.23 Why the Commission decided to 
create a rapporteurship that monitors only one right, while all 
the other rapporteurships monitor the rights of individuals in a 
vulnerable situation, is an unanswered question. Moreover, other 
vulnerable groups, such as persons with disabilities, the elderly, 
LGTBI communities, and people with HIV/AIDS do not have a 
rapporteurship.24
Having a rapporteurship on a right (whatever this is), instead 
of a rapporteurship on individuals in vulnerable situations, is 
not an irrelevant issue. If we accept that all human rights are 
supposed to be indivisible and interdependent,25 the natural 
consequence is that there is no hierarchy of rights because every 
right is as important as the others.26 Giving extra protection to 
one right over others could be read as de facto hierarchization. 
This does not mean that the Commission should never create 
rapporteurships on specific rights. It only means that if a right 
is going to have a special mechanism of protection, such as a 
special rapporteurship, compelling reasons should justify the 
prioritization and such prioritization should not be indefinite. 
On the contrary, persons in a situation of vulnerability are 
“segments of the population which are or should be the recipi-
ents of extra care and attention,”27 which mandates particular 
attention of States but also of international bodies like the 
Commission. Vulnerability does not focus on the right itself but 
on the holders of that right, who for one reason or another cannot 
exercise that right as freely as others, or who suffer a greater risk 
of infringement of that right.
The points presented so far should not be read as a false 
dichotomy that either the Commission must create rappor-
teurships concerning each and every vulnerable group and/or 
right, or it must not create any rapporteurship concerning any 
particular group and/or right. The Commission does not have 
enough resources to cover everything, and even if it did, creating 
a rapporteurship for each right or group could be unnecessary. 
Rather, the Commission should explain why it decided to cre-
ate this particular rapporteurship and why it should be special. 
If a rapporteurship is going to cover the rights of persons in a 
situation of vulnerability, the explanation of the Commission is 
much easier: vulnerable persons need special protection. A more 
detailed explanation is needed if the new 
rapporteurship is going to cover a right. 
All human rights are equally important 
but in certain scenarios, some rights 
might be in a greater danger of infringe-
ment. The Commission has failed to 
explain why freedom of expression needs 
special protection over other rights and, 
moreover, why this right has a rappor-
teurship with many more privileges that 
the other rapporteurships.
the SPecIal PrIVIlegeS of the 
SPecIal raPPorteurShIP
Being a special rapporteurship brings 
along a number of benefits that regular rapporteurships do not 
have, for instance:
1. The head of the SRFE, the Special Rapporteur, works on 
a full-time basis. The Special Rapporteur has a permanent 
office at the seat of the Commission. Regular rapporteurs, 
that is to say, the commissioners, work on a part-time 
basis. They meet a couple of times per year during the 
Commission’s periods of sessions.
2. The staff of the SRFE is composed of the Special 
Rapporteur, one project development specialist, three 
human rights specialists, one press coordinator, and  
one administrative assistant.28 This is an A-team that other 
rapporteurships do not have. For instance, the Rapporteurship 
on Migrant Workers has a part-time Rapporteur and one 
human rights specialist.29
3. The one and only concern of the SRFE is the right to 
freedom of expression. Regular rapporteurs must divide 
their attention between their country and thematic rappor-
teurships, plus their regular duties as commissioners. For 
instance, Commissioner Dinah Shelton, former President of 
the Commission, had to divide her time between her duties 
as President, her duties as Commissioner, her duties as 
Rapporteur of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bahamas, 
Belize, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, and her 
duties as Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples.30
4. The SRFE is the only rapporteurship that presents a separate 
annual report to the OAS General Assembly. The reports of 
the regular rapporteurships are included in the Commission’s 
Annual Report. In 2010 the section of the Commission’s 
Annual Report reserved for the regular rapporteurships' 
reports contained 10 pages, an average of 1.4 pages for each 
regular rapporteurship.31 Conversely, the annual report of the 
SRFE contained 415 pages.32
5. The SRFE is financed wholly through external funds 
specifically donated for this purpose by States from both 
inside and outside the region, as well as private donors. 
For reasons that need further research, the SRFE budget is 
considerably larger than those of other rapporteurships. For 
2010, the SRFE had projects for approximately USD $1.7 
million. This is 3.09 times the budget of the Rapporteurship 
on Women’s Rights ($556,350); 3.77 times the budget of 
the Rapporteurship on Indigenous Peoples ($453,000); 5 
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times the budget of the Rapporteurship on Persons Deprived 
of Their Liberty ($349,498); 5.86 times the budget of the 
Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers ($299,624); and 17 
times the budget of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of the 
Child ($105,969).33
One may say that some of the facts presented above are 
merely administrative issues that do not raise juridical issues, 
but as will be explained latter, the favoritism to one right does 
have implications for States, victims, and the Commission itself. 
Before that, the prospects for the future shall be considered.
ProSPectS for the future
The prospects for the near-future do not seem to suggest that 
there will be any changes in the preferential treatment freedom 
of expression receives. According to the Commission’s Strategic 
Plan 2011-2015, the SRFE’s activities will greatly exceed those 
of the other rapporteurships.34 The Commission’s plans are:
1. to hold twenty thematic hearings per year, which means that 
each regular rapporteurship will have approximately three 
hearings per year — during the same period, the SRFE plans 
to have ten hearings on freedom of expression;
2. to issue a report on each of the seven thematic areas every 
eighteen months — the SRFE will continue to issue a report 
on freedom of expression every twelve months;
3. to send eight cases to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights — the SRFE has the goal of moving at least nine 
cases per year through the System;
4. each regular rapporteur will make one working visit per year 
to countries in the region — the SRFE plans two visits per 
year to assess the situation regarding freedom of expression;
5. finally, the SRFE plans to give thirty seminars in fifteen dif-
ferent countries for journalists, academics and other mem-
bers of civil society — there is no mention that other rap-
porteurships will conduct seminars on their thematic areas.
This imbalance brings to mind at least two questions: a) what 
are the consequences of giving preferential treatment to one 
right, and b) why does the SRFE have the budget necessary to 
conduct all its previous and future activities.
the conSequenceS of haVIng a PreferentIal rIght
Giving preferential treatment to the right to freedom of 
expression has consequences. Firstly, since the situation of 
freedom of expression is not the same throughout the region, 
because some countries have more problems than others, the 
countries with doubtful records on freedom of expression feel 
targeted by the Commission. They would rather have an active 
rapporteurship on thematic areas in which they think they have 
better records. Such rapporteurships would thus focus on other 
countries that have worse records in those thematic areas. No 
state likes to be singled out. This may be the case of Ecuador and, 
therefore, those that argue that the true intentions of Ecuador are 
to stop the Commission from focusing on the country may not 
be entirely wrong. However, this is not the only consequence. 
A second result of the preferential treatment affects the victims 
of violations of other rights. As seen above, victims belonging 
to groups in a situation of vulnerability covered by the other 
thematic rapporteurships of the Commission have fewer chances 
that their cases will be heard by the Court, there will be fewer 
hearings, fewer in situ visits, less visibility in the Commission’s 
Annual Report, and so on. The right to freedom of expression 
becomes the king of the rights in the Americas, protecting a 
limited number of victims from a limited number of states.
It should also be noted that freedom of expression is already 
a directly enforceable right in the Inter-American System 
through the mechanism of individual petitions. Victims alleg-
ing the violation of this right can submit a complaint directly 
to the Commission, and the Commission may refer the case to 
the Court. Other rights, namely most of the economic, social, 
and cultural (ESC) rights are not directly enforceable. The 
only mechanism designed for their protection is the system of 
periodic reports States present to the Commission on regular a 
basis.35 If any group of rights requires special protection, that 
group should be ESC rights. The Commission, however, does not 
have a regular nor a special rapporteurship dedicated to monitor 
the compliance of ESC rights obligations. The Commission’s 
regular rapporteurships sometimes study the ESC rights of the 
vulnerable groups they cover, but again, regular rapporteurships 
have less financial and human resources that the SRFE.
the Srfe’S bIgger budget
As mentioned before, the question of the SRFE’s budget 
needs further research, but two preliminary reasons for its size 
could be advanced. On the one hand, the success of the SRFE 
in its fund-raising could be explained by the fact that it is the 
only rapporteurship with full-time personnel. This allows the 
Special Rapporteur to dedicate much more time to look for 
donors to increase the budget of the office. Current and former 
special rapporteurs on freedom of expression were very active 
and committed to their work, so the person in charge of the 
office also makes a big difference. Nonetheless, one question 
arises here: if the creation of a special rapporteurship on free-
dom of expression was proven to be a big success, why has the 
Commission not created other special rapporteurships, working 
full-time and also financed by private contributions? The SRFE 
has been functioning for fifteen years and the Commission has 
not created other special rapporteurships fully funded by exter-
nal contributions and not by the Commission’s limited budget.
On the other hand, the success of the SRFE could be explained 
by the receptiveness of the donors. As seen above, it seems that 
donors are inclined to support this particular rapporteurship more 
than the others. If that is the case, the ones that truly decide where 
the attention should be, or at least the degree of this attention, are 
the donors, not the Commission. This may be a good motive why 
Ecuador considers that the Commission’s impartiality or indepen-
dence could be affected. At first sight, the Ecuadorian concerns 
seem a little excessive, but a closer view may reveal that such 
concerns are not without basis. The SRFE is a very active office 
and has done the job it was expected to do. There has been no 
sign of influence of external sources in the SRFE conclusions or 
recommendations. This office is like an engine and the budget is 
its fuel. If the machine has enough fuel, it will do the tasks it was 
built to do. Without the fuel, it will stop. But fueling the machine 
is the issue that should be looked at with more caution. The fuel 
comes from donors whose intentions could be quite philanthropist 
or the opposite, with a hidden agenda.
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Consequently, Ecuador’s proposals on the functioning of the 
Commission’s rapporteurships, approved by the Working Group 
and by the Permanent Council, seem reasonable. If donors truly 
want to contribute to the promotion and protection of human 
rights in the Americas, they should not specify the purpose of 
their voluntary contributions; rather, the Commission should 
be the body to assign the resources to all its rapporteurships in 
an adequate, sufficient, and balanced way, according to needs 
it has identified in the region. Again, the Commission, not the 
donors, should decide how to address the human rights situa-
tion in the region. Evidently, the OAS 
Member States, Ecuador included, are 
primarily responsible for giving enough 
fuel to all the protection mechanisms 
the Commission has; yet until this goal 
is achieved, the recommendations of the 
Working Group should be taken seriously.
the workIng grouP’S 
recommendatIonS and the 
commISSIon’S reSPonSe
The Working Group recommended 
that the Commission: a) include clear 
and accessible information in its Annual 
Report on the management of the 
resources it receives; b) invite donors to make their voluntary 
contributions without specifying how the funds should be used 
until the Inter-American System is sufficiently funded; c) assign 
adequate, sufficient, and balanced resources to all its rappor-
teurships, working groups, and units; and d) incorporate all 
rapporteurs’ reports under a single chapter of the Commission’s 
Annual Report.36
The Commission responded to these suggestions on October 
23, 2012.37 The Commission was willing to adopt certain mea-
sures in concurrence with the recommendations, but there is no 
indication that freedom of expression’s preferential treatment will 
cease in the near future. For instance, although the Commission 
has already created a “basket” or common fund to provide an 
incentive for financing its activities,38 the rapporteurships will 
still be free to seek external donations. As such, the funding of 
the rapporteurships will continue to depend on the donors’ will 
and intentions.39 In fact, the Commission has openly recognized 
that in the event a Member State or a permanent observer “from 
the start, establishes thematic priorities for which its funds are 
to be used, the [Commission] will accept them provided that the 
thematic objective coincides with its strategic priorities and pre-
viously established action plans.”40 Secondly, the Commission 
recognized the importance of transparent management. It offered 
to include all budgetary information in its Annual Report broken 
down by (i) source of financing, (ii) whether regular fund or spe-
cific funds, and (iii) item expenditure.41 However, this informa-
tion is already available on the Commission’s website.42 Sadly, 
the information released by the Commission is not classified by 
rapporteurships. External observers cannot compare how much 
each rapporteurship receives and who is financing them. On the 
SRFE’s website, there is no concrete information either,43 and in 
the SRFE’s latest Annual Report only the donors are mentioned, 
but not the amount they contributed.44 Finally, there is no indica-
tion that the Commission is going to increase the personnel of 
the regular rapporteurships or balance the number of hearings, 
in loco visits, or other rapporteurship activities, nor the number 
of cases these offices will to refer to the Court. Nor is there is 
any indication that the Commission is planning to transform the 
SRFE into a regular rapporteurship under the supervision of a 
commissioner elected by the OAS Member States. Moreover, if 
the mechanism of special rapporteurs is going to be maintained, 
there is no indication that the Commission is planning to cre-
ate new special rapporteurships to cover other rights different 
from freedom of expression or that the SRFE will cease in the 
near future, giving the floor to another 
right. In sum, freedom of expression will 
continue to be the king of rights in the 
Americas.
the code of conduct
The Working Group recommended 
that the Commission “[i]ntroduce a code 
of conduct to govern the management 
of [the Commission’s] rapporteurships 
in order to ensure the requisite coordi-
nation between those mechanisms and 
states[.]”45 According to some, the code 
implies greater state control over the 
different rapporteurships,46 or it could 
prevent the SRFE from publishing press releases that allegedly 
upset countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador.47
These positions seem to ignore that the Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure already stipulate that “[t]he activities 
and functions provided for in the Rapporteurships’ mandates 
shall be performed in accordance with the present Rules of 
Procedure and the guidelines, codes of conduct and manuals 
that the Commission might adopt[.]”48 In other words, the 
Working Group’s recommendation basically requires a policy 
the Commission has already partially enacted. It should also 
be highlighted that the Working Group’s recommendation is 
directed toward the Commission and not the States; that is to 
say, the Commission is the one that should introduce the code 
of conduct and not Ecuador, Venezuela, or any other country. 
Naturally, it is expected that the Commission make space for an 
ample debate between the States and civil society organizations 
before it adopts such a code. This seems to be the Commission’s 
intention.49
As to the press releases that “upset” countries such as 
Ecuador, one case may explain the Ecuadorian confrontation 
with the SRFE, but may justify the need for a Code of Conduct.
the El UnivErso caSe
On July 20, 2011, a judge in Ecuador issued a judgment 
against the newspaper El Universo, three members of its board 
of directors, and one editorialist, all as a result of a defama-
tory publication of a column in the newspaper that offended 
President Rafael Correa and upset many Ecuadorians. The judg-
ment sentenced the board members and the editorialist to three 
years in prison and the payment of a total of USD $30 million. 
The legal entity that owns the newspaper was also sentenced to 
a fine of $10 million.
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The next day, the SRFE issued a press release expressing 
its concern regarding the El Universo judgment. However, the 
SRFE did not limit itself to express concern or to inform on the 
Inter-American and universal standards on freedom of expres-
sion. It made statements like the following:
The Office of the Special Rapporteur considers this 
decision contrary to regional freedom of expression 
standards and believes that it generates self-censorship 
and a notable chilling effect that impacts not only the 
individuals convicted but Ecuadorian 
society as a whole.
. . .
In addition, the decision of July 
20 constitutes a grave warning to 
any citizen or media outlet that has 
opinions or information about public 
officials that could be considered 
offensive, thus obstructing processes 
that are natural and necessary in any 
democracy.
. . .
For these reasons, the Office of the 
Special Rapporteur exhorts the State 
of Ecuador to adapt its domestic 
legislation and practice to exist-
ing doctrine and jurisprudence in the area of freedom  
of expression . . . .50
The alleged victims appealed the judgment and the case was 
sent to the Court of Appeals (Corte Provincial), which con-
firmed the criminal and civil judgment on September 20, 2011. 
On September 21, 2011, the SRFE issued a new press release 
stating the following:
The judicial decisions in question generate a palpable 
chilling effect on ideas or information that may offend 
the authorities, an effect which is incompatible with 
hemispheric freedom of expression standards. The 
self-censorship that results from these types of deci-
sions impacts not only journalists and the authorities 
themselves, but all of Ecuadorian society.
. . .
Given the gravity of the judicial decision in question, 
the Office of the Special Rapporteur once again calls 
on the Ecuadorian State to bring its normative frame-
work and institutional practices into compliance with 
inter-American standards in the area of freedom of 
expression.51
The alleged victims requested the intervention of the Supreme 
Court (Corte Nacional), which in February 2012 confirmed the 
decisions of the lower courts. The SRFE issued a joint press 
release with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression.52 This time the wording of the press 
release was much less confrontational than the previous ones, 
and both rapporteurs limited themselves to reminding the reader 
of international standards on freedom of expression. Perhaps 
this extra caution was the consequence of the involvement of the 
UN Special Rapporteur, but it is hard to tell with certainty by an 
outside observer.
After the Supreme Court of Ecuador confirmed the convic-
tion, President Correa decided to pardon the offenders and the 
case was closed at the national level.53 No fine was collected and 
none of the accused spent a single hour in jail. The case, though, is 
still pending before the Commission, in the admissibility stage of 
the proceedings. However, the SRFE’s July and September 2011 
press releases were issued before the alleged victims exhausted local 
remedies and before any type of pronouncement of the Commission 
on the merits of the case. The SRFE clearly labeled the facts of the 
case as “contrary to freedom of expression 
standards,” an obstruction to democracy, 
and a source of “chilling effects” on ideas 
or information. It also requested that the 
country adapt its practice and law to the 
Inter-American standards.
The SRFE’s July and September 
2011 press releases could be read as 
pre-judgments made outside the regular 
proceedings that the Commission has to 
follow in all individual petition cases. A 
rapporteurship should not be allowed to 
essentially declare a violation of human 
rights before the Commission decides the 
case. This is a basic due process rule to 
guarantee a forum’s impartiality.54
The SRFE does not have a vote in the Commission’s deci-
sion on its pending cases, but it does have a voice. The Special 
Rapporteur participates in the Commission’s deliberations and 
hearings; the Rapporteur may pose questions to the parties and 
may even represent the Commission in the procedure before the 
Inter-American Court. In fact, all the freedom of expression-
related cases, including El Universo, are processed in the office 
of the SRFE. Is Ecuador allowed to challenge the participation 
of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in any 
matter involving the pending case of El Universo if the State 
considered that the SRFE pre-judged the case? It seems that in 
order to preserve the Commission’s impartiality, the answer to 
this question should be in the affirmative.
The Rules of Procedure of the Commission do not answer all 
these questions. The Code of Conduct then seems to be neces-
sary to fill this and other gaps.55
concluSIonS
Ecuador may have had political motives when it presented 
its proposals to the Working Group but this does not necessarily 
mean that the proposals are unfounded. The practice of the 
Commission shows that there is no uniformity in the creation 
and mandate of its rapporteurships. Only one rapporteurship, 
the SRFE, is special and devoted to a single right, while all the 
others are regular and devoted to persons in situations of vulner-
ability. The Commission has never explained why the right to 
freedom of expression, and not other rights, deserves a special 
rapporteurship. The Commission’s lack of resources does not 
explain why it has not decided to create other special rapporteur-
ships that work full-time and search for private funding.
The disproportional treatment of human rights in the 
Commission’s rapporteurship mechanisms produces at least 
A rapporteurship should 
not be allowed to essentially 
declare a violation of human 
rights before the Commission 
decides the case. This is 
a basic due process rule 
to guarantee a forum’s 
impartiality.
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three consequences. Firstly, the States that (may) have poor 
records on freedom of expression are more targeted than States 
that have poor records on other rights. Secondly, victims of vio-
lations of the right to freedom of expression have more space and 
attention than victims of violations of other rights. Finally, donors, 
not the Commission, seem to be the ones that decide which right 
receives more attention. The Commission needs more funding, 
but it also needs more balance.
Finally, the Code of Conduct suggested by Ecuador and the 
Working Group does not seem to be a preposterous idea. The 
Commission itself recognized the need for a manual, guidelines, 
or code of conduct for its rapporteurships. Furthermore, aspects 
of the rapporteurship’s functioning, such as the content of their 
press releases, seem to lack sufficient regulation.
In short, Ecuador may have had a hidden agenda, but the 
Commission is the one supplying Ecuador with the ammuni-
tion used against it. If the Commission would explain better the 
process of creation, mandates, duration, and other aspects of its 
rapporteurships, Ecuador’s proposals would have received less 
support.
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